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RE-OPENING THE DOOR TO ANTITRUST
STANDING: R.C BIGELOW, INC. v.
UNILEVER N. V.
In order to protect free enterprise from anticompetitive con-
duct,' a number of statutory prohibitions and remedies have been
developed and codified in the antitrust laws.2 Among the most im-
portant of these enactments is section 7 of the Clayton Acts (the
"Act"), which prohibits any merger or acquisition 4 where the effect
' See T. BRUNNER, T. KRATTENMAKER, R. SKITOL, & A. WEBSTER, MERGERS IN THE NEW
ANTITRUST ERA 6-7 (1985) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ERA]. When rivals "compete perfectly"
goods are produced at maximum efficiency, with the least use of resources and at the least
cost, so that the goods will be sold at the lowest price. Id. at 6. However, absent competi-
tion, there is no need for a firm to concern itself with maximum efficiency; instead it may
maximize profits by selling at prices well above those it could charge in the presence of
competitors. Id. at 7. The result is that some consumers may not have the means to
purchase the higher priced goods for the very reason that the goods were not produced at
maximum efficiency. Id. Thus, by protecting free enterprise and competition, the consumer
is protected as well. Id.
2 Specifically, the antitrust laws include the following:
1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982), whose purpose is to promote unrestrained
competition so as to result in optimal resource allocation and, therefore, the lowest prices,
see T. VAKERIcS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-2 (1985);
2. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), whose purpose is to
supplement the general provisions of the Sherman Act by addressing specific problems it
overlooked, such as mergers and acquisitions, interlocking directorates, and exclusive deal-
ing arrangements, see T. VAKERICS, supra, § 1.01, at 1-3, § 1.0212], at 1-6 to 1-7;
3. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1982), embodied in § 2 of the
Clayton Act, prohibiting certain instances of price discrimination, see T. VAKERICS, supra, §
1.02, at 1-7 to 1-8; and
4. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982 & Supp.
1989), which strengthens the authority of the federal government to proceed against a broad
range of potentially anticompetitive practices, see T. VAKERICS, supra, § 1.02[4], at 1-9.
The antitrust laws focus primarily on the conduct of market participants rather than on
the market structure per se, id. § 1.01, at 1-4, striking at conduct such as collusion, unrea-
sonable refusal to associate with competitors, distribution restriction, resale price fixing, mo-
nopolization, and participation in certain mergers and acquisitions. See B. KELLMAN, PRI-
VATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 36, 66, 92-93, 107, 161, 189 (1985).
- 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
See Lewyn & Mann, Ten Years Under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1073-1074 (1961).
Mergers can be divided into three classes: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Id. Horizon-
tal mergers are mergers between manufacturers of the same product. Id. They disadvantage
consumers in that they eliminate one alternative source of supply. Id. Vertical mergers in-
volve the merging of a manufacturer with its supplier. Id. Not only do competing suppliers
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"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."' 5 Section 4 of the Act provides that a party aggrieved
lose a potential customer, but, alternatively, competing manufacturers may find that their
supply source has been eliminated or that the merging manufacturer now has an advantage
arising out of operating economies. Id. In a conglomerate merger, two firms at different
functional levels in different product or geographic markets join together. Id. The resulting
firm's increased resources may create a significant competitive advantage. See id.
Antitrust laws governing mergers provide protection only from anticompetitive behav-
ior, not from increased or vigorous competition. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Matic, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962) (antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors). Therefore, the anti-
trust laws provide no relief where a firm drives competitors out of business or monopolizes a
particular market merely by exercising superior skill. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo.,
Inc., 479 U.S., 104, 116 (1986). Inherent in any merger is the potential for economic adjust-
ments adversely affecting competition. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487. For instance, merg-
ers may act to decrease consumer choice without increasing industry capacity, jobs, or out-
put. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 345 n.72. Nevertheless, mergers can serve important economic
functions, such as penalizing inefficient management, aiding the efficient flow of investment
capital and maximizing resource allocation. See United States Dep't of Justice Merger
Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,827 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines].
5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 7 reads in pertinent part: "No person
engaged in commerce shall ... acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or... assets of another person engaged also in commerce ... where ... the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monop-
oly." Id.
Monopoly power is said to exist where a product is controlled by a single interest and
there are no reasonable substitutes available for the product. United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956). However, merely possessing monopoly
power does not "ipso facto condemn a market participant." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
Before the Clayton Act was passed in 1914, mergers had been challenged by the federal
government as violative of the Sherman Act, but without much success. ANTITRUST ERA,
supra note 1, at 3. The difficulty lay in the fact that the Sherman Act was aimed at the
realization, as opposed to the expectation, of monopoly. United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920). Section 7 of the Clayton Act was specifically designed to
arrest corporate mergers while the threat to competition was "still in its incipiency." Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317; see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622
(1974); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592-93 (1957); S. REP.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950). Recognizing that market control may be gained
through a series of acquisitions, as opposed to a single transaction, Congress intended that §
7 provide a mechanism through which such a cumulative process could be enjoined when a
proposed acquisition would have a substantially adverse effect on competition. Id. at 5.
As originally enacted, however, § 7 applied to acquisitions of stock and not to the acqui-
sition of the assets of the target company. Lewyn & Mann, supra note 4, at 1067 n.1. Corpo-
rations began using this loophole to circumvent the statute and defeat its purpose, thus
making the Miller-Tydings amendment in 1950 a practical necessity. See United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 338-40 (1963). The main purpose of the Miller-Tyd-
ings amendment was to bring asset acquisitions under the purview of § 7 in order to allevi-
ate the fear caused by increasing economic concentration. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315.
However, the Miller-Tydings amendment failed to provide a clear indication of whether
a quantitative or qualitative standard is to be used in measuring the anticompetitive effects
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by a violation of section 7 may recover treble damages for the re-
sulting loss to business or property.6 In addition, section 16 per-
mits a private plaintiff to seek injunctive relief "against threatened
loss or damage" from a section 7 violation.' In order for a private
of mergers. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22. Apparently, Congress intended that a vari-
ety of economic factors be used in determining the potential for any anticompetitive effects.
Id. Because Congress could not reasonably draw up a laundry list of proscribed activities,
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the Justice Department, and the courts must exer-
cise discretion and evaluate mergers in a manner that is reasonable in light of the particular
facts and circumstances. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at 26,827; J. VAN CISE,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 9-11 (4th rev. ed. 1982). For example, "a definition of illegal
monopolization as a person seeking to control 90 percent of the trade might be justified for
large producers of basic commodities competing in a national market, but . . . would be
unrealistic for the only theater in a small town." Id. at 10.
6 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Section 4 reads in pertinent part: "[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... ." Id.
The treble damages provision apparently provides great incentive to bring suit. From June
30, 1965 through 1983, more than 90% of the antitrust suits filed in the federal district
courts were private actions. T. VAKERICS, supra note 2, § 3.01, at 3-1.
1 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) (emphasis added). Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief.., against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the anti-
trust laws including [§7] when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity ... and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss
or damage is immediate ...
Id. Prior to the enactment of § 16 in 1914, a private party was not entitled to sue to prevent
or restrain violations of the antitrust laws, see, e.g., General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S.
Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 286 (1922), even if that party was threatened with an injury different
from that suffered by the public at large. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471
(1917). Section 16 was designed to cure an anomaly: a private plaintiff could recover treble
damages for his losses, but "[t]here [was] no provision . . . to prevent threatened loss or
damage even though it be irreparable. The practical effect of this [was] that a man would
have to sit by and see his business ruined before he could take advantage of his remedy." 51
CONG. REc. 9261 (1914). There appears to be some question as to whether quantifiable dam-
ages need to be shown in order to obtain injunctive relief. Compare Ashley Meadows Farm,
Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 617 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quantified
damages not necessary) with Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,
723 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (quantified damages required).
Private injunctive relief has come to serve three main purposes: ending the illegal con-
duct, depriving the violators of the benefits of their conduct, and restoring competition.
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); T. VAKERICS, supra note 2, § 3.04[1], at 3-31. To be entitled to
injunctive relief, the private plaintiff must make the same showing as is required for an
injunction in any equitable action. See B. KELLMAN, supra note 2, at 364. The plaintiff must
show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable harm not
compensable by damages if the injunction is denied; (3) the harm to the defendant if an
injunction is granted will be less than the harm to the plaintiff if it is denied; and (4) the
public interest will be served by an injunction. Warner v. Central Trust Co., 715 F.2d 1121,
1123 (6th Cir. 1983); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506,
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plaintiff to bring such an action, he must first demonstrate that he
has suffered, or is in danger of suffering, an "antitrust injury."8
Because actions for injunctive relief, unlike actions for treble dam-
ages, pose no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, 9
a question existed as to whether the requirement of antitrust in-
jury should be as strict under section 16 as it is under section 4.10
The Supreme Court apparently resolved this issue in Cargill, Inc.
v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.," when it affirmatively stated that the
presence of antitrust injury is as necessary to an action under sec-
511 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
Courts have been hesitant to grant injunctive relief because of the serious consequences
of the remedy. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 414 F.2d at 510-11 & n.8. Injunctive relief may put
an end to the defendant's business while failing to compensate the plaintiff for his losses or
attorney's fees. Kintner & Wilberding, Enforcement of the Merger Laws by Private Party
Litigation, 47 IND. L.J. 293, 298-99 (1972). The remedy may be particularly fatal in merger
cases since the parties may abandon their plans instead of going through long, costly litiga-
tion. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 414 F.2d at 510-11 & n.8.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the remedies provided under § 4 and §
16 is that under the former the plaintiff is required to show actual injury to recover, while
under the latter just the threat of injury is sufficient for recovery. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(1982). Despite this difference, the provisions are said to provide "complimentary remedies
for a single set of injuries," Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113, and should be applied only when neces-
sary to protect the public interest in a manner consistent with the congressional intent. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
' Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. "Antitrust injury" is defined as an "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful." Id. Merely showing that a purported injury was proximately caused by an
antitrust violation is not enough. See id. at 488. "The injury must reflect the anticompeti-
tive effect of either the violation of antitrust law or of the anticompetitive acts made possi-
ble by the violation." Midwestern Waffles, 734 F.2d at 710. However, even if a plaintiff can
show antitrust injury, standing may still be defeated for a number of other reasons, such as
the indirectness of the injury, the presence of another potential plaintiff whose self-interest
would cause him to defend the public interest, the speculative nature of the injury, and the
difficulty inherent in determining and apportioning damages between direct and indirect
victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries. See Volvo North Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof.
Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1988).
1 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). Once an injunction
has been granted for one party, it is, in effect, granted for every other party who may have
sought one. See id.
1 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6; Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985). In the
past, the prevailing view seems to have been that a more liberal standard would be applied
in determining standing under § 16 than under § 4, Ashley Meadows Farm, 617 F. Supp. at
1063, so that a plaintiff would have to meet a lower threshold requirement to gain injunctive
relief, although antitrust injury would still have to be shown. Christian Schmidt Brewing,
753 F.2d at 1358. For a discussion of the evolution of standing requirements under § 16, see
generally Note, Standing to Sue for Clayton Act Injunctions: Chrysler-Injured Party or
Disgruntled Competitor?, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1278-85 (1985).
" 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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tion 16 as it is under section 4.12 Recently, however, in R.C. Bige-
low, Inc. v. Unilever N.V.," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that in a summary judgment proceeding, a showing of sub-
stantial post-acquisition market share is sufficient in itself to es-
tablish a threat of antitrust injury and thus grant standing to a
competitor seeking to enjoin a challenged merger. 14
In R.C. Bigelow, the defendant, Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. ("Lip-
ton"), had entered into an agreement to purchase the co-defend-
ant, Celestial Seasonings, Inc. ("Celestial").15 The proposed merger
would have resulted in Lipton having an eighty-four percent share
of the market for herbal tea.16 The plaintiff, R.C. Bigelow, Inc.
("Bigelow"), was the third largest producer of herbal tea, with a
thirteen percent market share.'1 After the announcement of the
proposed acquisition, Bigelow brought an action pursuant to sec-
tion 16 of the Clayon Act to enjoin the merger,' claiming that the
proposed acquisition would give Lipton an undue share of the
herbal tea market and thereby threaten to substantially lessen
competition and create a monopoly.'" The defendants moved for
12 Id. at 105, 109-11, 122. The Cargill Court made it significantly more difficult for
competitors to enjoin corporate mergers since merely being a competitor of an alleged mo-
nopolist would no longer be sufficient to establish antitrust standing. Phototron Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988). The
Cargill Court stated that "[iut is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to
engage in vigorous competition." Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116 (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer,
729 F.2d at 1057) (emphasis added); see Phototron Corp., 842 F.2d at 100. Although the
Cargill Court declined to adopt a per se rule against granting competitors standing to chal-
lenge mergers, Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121, it did note that merely competing for increased
market share is not the type of activity the antitrust laws were introduced to prevent. Id. at
116.
13 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989)
14 Id. at 111.
" Id. at 103.
10 Id. at 103-04. Celestial was the largest producer of herbal tea, with 52% of the mar-
ket share. Id. at 103. Lipton, with a 32% market share was the second largest producer. Id.
at 104.
17 Id.
8, Id. In the interim, the FTC had made a full investigation of the proposed transaction
and apparently found no reason to challenge it. See id.
"9 See id. Bigelow claimed that the proposed merger would allow Lipton to engage in
various anticompetitive activities. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 689 F. Supp. 76, 80
(D. Conn. 1988), rev'd, 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989). Most im-
portantly, Bigelow contended that Lipton would engage in predatory pricing. Id. Bigelow
also claimed that Lipton would exercise improper control over shelf space in retail stores
since Lipton's parent, Unilever, was one of the world's largest distributors of grocery goods,
with access to supermarket shelf space nationwide. R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 104. Finally,
Bigelow argued that Lipton would exercise improper control over distributors to retail stores
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summary judgment, arguing that Bigelow had failed to raise a gen-
uine issue of fact as to whether it was threatened with antitrust
injury.2° The district court, finding no evidence of anticompetitive
or predatory behavior, granted the motion.21 On appeal, the court
of appeals reversed.22
Writing for the court, Judge Altimari stated that, while a post-
acquisition market share of eighty-four percent does not constitute
a per se violation of the antitrust laws,2" it is prima facie evidence
of monopoly power, and thus raises a presumption of illegality suf-
ficient to survive a motion for summary judgment at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage.24 Reasoning that the transaction and result-
ing market share would give Lipton a "decisive advantage" over
the competition, the court concluded that a "demonstrated
probability" of antitrust injury existed.25 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court relied on United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank,26 in which the Supreme Court held that transactions which
significantly increase market share are "so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that [they] must be enjoined. '27
In R.C. Bigelow, the Second Circuit turned a blind eye toward
the fact findings of the trial court when it chose to focus solely on
market share data. In doing so, it is submitted that the court mis-
interpreted Cargill, and misapplied the law regarding summary
judgment as it has come to relate to antitrust actions. Further-
more, the court broke with the modern trend against applying
mechanical, protectionist rules in merger cases. Finally, this Com-
ment will suggest that the R.C. Bigelow holding is actually anti-
thetical to the purpose of the antitrust laws, as it will have a chil-
and suppliers of raw herbs. R.C. Bigelow, 689 F. Supp. at 80.
20 R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 104. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, the
defendants agreed that the relevant market was one for herbal tea, not all tea. R.C. Bigelow,
689 F. Supp. at 79 n.3.
2 R.C. Bigelow, 689 F. Supp. at 82. The district court found no evidence of improper
intent behind the proposed merger or of any substantial likelihood that Lipton would en-
gage in anticompetitive activity, id. at 80-82, and held that mere possession of potential
monopoly power is not sufficient to establish that such power will be used to the detriment
of competitors and thus create antitrust standing. Id. at 79. Further, the court found that
Lipton intended only to "play hardball" with the competitors and had no intention of elimi-
nating competitors other than by "vigorous competition" and "efficiency." Id. at 80.
22 R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 103.
2 Id. at 110.
24 See id. at 108-111.
25 See id. at 109.
26 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
217 R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (quoting Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363).
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ling effect on competition and serve to encourage meritless
litigation.
THE Cargill RULE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Although Cargill represents a landmark case in the field of an-
titrust law, its holding is relatively simple and unequivocal: to es-
tablish standing under section 16 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff is
required to show a threat of antitrust injury.2" The Cargill Court
sought to ensure that absent some evidence of their having en-
gaged in anticompetitive conduct,29 successful market participants
would not be threatened by their less successful competitors. In
R.C. Bigelow, although the district court found no evidence of any
such conduct,30 the Second Circuit found that an inherent threat
of antitrust injury in the defendants' potential market share in it-
self was sufficient to satisfy Cargill.3 1 Judge Altimari reasoned that
a substantial market share would foster predatory pricing.3 2 Rely-
ing on the Cargill Court's refusal to adopt a per se rule denying
standing for necessarily speculative claims of antitrust injury, such
as claims of predatory pricing,33 the R.C. Bigelow court held that
29 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986).
29 See id. at 115-19.
30 R.C. Bigelow, 689 F. Supp. at 80-82. The trial court found no evidence of improper
intent behind Lipton's proposed acquisition or of any substantial likelihood that Lipton
would use its post-merger status in any proscribed manner. Id. Most importantly, Bigelow
alleged that a threat of predatory pricing would be posed by the merger but "failed to sub-
mit any evidence whatsoever" and even admitted having "no idea what prices will do" after
the merger. Id. at 80; see also infra note 33 (discussing predatory pricing).
31 See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 110. The court extensively relied on market share as a
measure of a firm's ability to eliminate competition. See id. at 107-08. However, it is well
documented that market share standing alone may not be indicative of the potential an-
ticompetitive effects of a corporate transaction. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text.
32 See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 110-11.
33 Id. at 110; see Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc, 479 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1986).
Predatory pricing is pricing below the level necessary to sell particular goods or at a price
below the cost of such goods, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 585 n.8 (1986), in order to eliminate competitors and reduce competition. Cargill, 479
U.S. at 117. In Matsushita, the Supreme Court recognized that predatory pricing is "by [its]
nature speculative," as the profitability of such schemes depends on maintaining monopoly
power long enough to both neutralize the competition and recoup losses. Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 588. All that is certain is that the predator will have to forego immediate profit, and,
therefore, such schemes are "rarely tried and even more rarely successful." Id. at 589; see
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
943 (1982). Thus the Supreme Court noted that only direct evidence of pricing below cost
will be sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that rational businessmen do not en-
gage in such practices. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.9.
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market share alone may pose a substantial threat of antitrust
injury.3 4
The Cargill Court, however, was merely recognizing that inju-
ries which rarely occur are nonetheless injuries.3 5 Declining to
adopt a per se rule in no way mitigated the plaintiffs burden of
coming forward with some evidence of a threat of antitrust in-
jury. Simply equating a substantial market share with such a
threat defeats Cargill's purpose of ensuring that the alleged anti-
trust injury is something other than mere loss due to vigorous
competition.37
The R.C. Bigelow court distinguished Cargill by emphasizing
that the instant appeal was not related to a permanent injunction,
but merely a motion for summary judgment at the preliminary in-
junction stage.38 The Cargill Court, however, gave no indication
that such a distinction would have changed its analysis.3 9 Further-
more, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that, despite
the inherent complexity of the typical antitrust action, summary
judgment is nonetheless appropriate in certain circumstances, 0
34 R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 111.
"I See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121. The Cargill Court noted that "[w]hile firms may engage
in [predatory pricing] only infrequently there is ample evidence suggesting that the practice
does occur. It would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing... merely because such
injuries rarely occur." Id. (footnote omitted).
- See id. at 121-22. Immediately after declining to adopt such a rule, the Supreme
Court reiterated the requirement of demonstrating antitrust injury. Id. at 122.
37 See id. at 116; see also supra note 4 (antitrust laws do not protect against vigorous
competition).
38 See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 109-10.
3 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 ("We hold that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under
section 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury").
40 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §
2732.1, at 324 (1983) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT]. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (the summary judgment rule) has not been read out of
antitrust cases. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 283-90 (1968). In
fact, "the modern trend appears to reflect a view that antitrust cases should not . .. be
treated differently from other complex cases where summary judgment is appropriate." T.
VAKERICS, supra note 2, § 3.04[2], at 3-5. For example, summary judgment in antitrust cases
may be appropriate where questions of motive or intent are immaterial, see Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971), or
where the case turns solely on documentary evidence. Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603
F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., 452 F.2d 876, 881 (10th Cir.
1971). However, because antitrust cases often do involve questions of motive, intent, credi-
bility, and conspiracy, i.e., questions involving a subjective state of mind, typically they can
be answered only after a full trial where witnesses have been presented and subjected to
cross-examination. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
For this reason, summary judgment has been granted sparingly in antitrust cases. Id. at 473;
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particularly where extensive discovery has been conducted and has
failed to produce any significant evidence in support of the allega-
tions.4' Since the parties in R.C. Bigelow indicated that they were
prepared to go to trial and that no further discovery was needed,42
it is submitted that summary judgment was proper in the absence
of specific evidence of anticompetitive activity.
Moreover, the plaintiff in R.C. Bigelow should have been re-
quired to produce substantial evidence; reliance on pleadings, alle-
gations and self-serving statements43 should not have sufficed. The
court relied on post-acquisition market share as sufficient evidence
of antitrust injury.44 However, it is well documented that market-
share data standing alone are ambiguous at best.45 As the Cargill
Court explained, a finding of increased market share is at least as
indicative of vigorous competition as it is of an antitrust viola-
C. WRIGHT, supra.
"' See Midwestern Waffles Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 717 (11th Cir. 1984);
cf. Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 299 (dismissal should be granted sparingly prior to discovery). It
is well settled that "summary judgment is appropriate in those antitrust cases where plain-
tiffs, after having engaged in extensive discovery, fail to produce 'significant probative evi-
dence' in support of the allegations in their complaint." Midwestern Waffles, 734 F.2d at
717 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1140
(E.D. Pa. 1981)).
" R.C. Bigelow, 689 F. Supp. at 78.
" See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986);
Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 289-90; Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 98-99
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988); Midwestern Waffles, 734 F.2d at 714 ; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee notes (to permit pleadings to stand in way of
justified summary judgment defeats rule's purpose); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 933 (2d ed.
1970) (purpose of summary judgment is to pierce allegations).
R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 111.
4' See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (market
share, while greatly significant, must be looked at in view of industry in question); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962) (same). While market share data is
the primary index of market power, id., it is not a conclusive indicator of anticompetitive
effects. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498. Market share must be evaluated in light of
other relevant economic factors, such as the trend toward and degree of concentration in the
industry, the past history of the firm in question, and the barriers to entry into the industry.
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1071-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd
sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971). In R.C. Bigelow, the Second Circuit
simply assumed that market share data is an accurate indicator of the threat of antitrust
injury. See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 111. Although the court acknowledged that fuller de-
velopment of the relevance of the market share data could be undertaken at a trial on the
merits, id., it is submitted that the court should have required some specificity in the allega-
tion of anticompetitive conduct before undertaking a potentially massive factual contro-
versy. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) ("in a case of this magnitude, a district court must
retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially
massive factual controversy to proceed").
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tion.46 Equating substantial market share with a threat of antitrust
injury simply because a case is in the preliminary injunction stage
is not warranted.
MECHANICAL RULES AND THE "ANTI-BIG" BIAS
In holding that an eighty-four percent market share, absent
any evidence of anticompetitive behavior, raises a presumption of
illegality,47 the court in R.C. Bigelow resurrected an "anti-big" bias
of an earlier era and the concomitant rule which prohibited merg-
ers that would result in single-control of a substantial market
share. 'S This early concern with market share was based on a fear
that the concentration of economic power would result in an indus-
trial oligarchy capable of usurping power from the people and their
elected representatives. 49 Gradually, however, the courts recog-
48 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986). The burden is on the
plaintiff to produce some evidence which excludes the possibility that a violation has not
occurred. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). But where that
evidence is as indicative of permissible competition as it is of anticompetitive activity, it will
not alone support an inference of antitrust violation. Id. at 763-64; accord Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 597 n.21. This is especially true where the conduct complained of, predatory pricing,
is achieved by the same method which is used to stimulate competition, i.e., cutting prices.
Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594. Further, the legislative history
makes clear that § 7 was meant to deal with probabilities, not possibilities, United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1957), and not merely with ephemeral
or remote probabilities, but with probabilities which are sufficiently imminent. See United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 & n.22 (1974); Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 323. Moreover, granting summary judgment where evidence of an antitrust violation
is at best speculative or ambiguous is not likely to encourage businesses to engage in im-
proper activity. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595.
See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108.
's See Marinelli, Judicial Reexamination of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 20 AN1. Bus.
L.J. 203, 204-05 (1982). The "anti-big" bias finds its roots at least as early as 1911 in com-
ments made by Justice Brandeis. According to Justice Brandeis, "the proposition that mere
bigness can not be offense against society is false, because ... our society, which rests upon
democracy, cannot endure under such conditions. Something approaching equality is essen-
tial." Hearings on S. Rep No. 98 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d
Cong. 1st Sess. 1167 (1911) [hereinafter S. Rep. on Interstate Commerce].
10 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives
of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should
be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of
the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices,
the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men.
Id. at 536 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the view of the FTC, if nothing had been done to
check economic concentration, the government would have been forced to intervene in order
to avert giant corporations from taking over the country. ANTITRUST ERA, supra note 1, at 5.
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nized the potential economic benefits of corporate mergers so that
the mere possession of monopoly power was no longer an auto-
matic condemnation.5 0 The mechanical, protectionist policies of
the past began to give way to a policy of economic realism 51 in
which the per se market share test was rejected52 in favor of a rule
of reason, requiring a showing of danger in the merger itself, as
opposed to its size alone.53
In conferring standing on the plaintiff in R.C. Bigelow, the
court relied on United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,54 a
1963 Supreme Court case which held that mergers producing firms
This concern with market share grew to such proportions that acquisitions involving market
share increases as little as three percent were deemed to be sufficiently anticompetitive to
merit relief. See Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 28,667 (FTC Order, March 25,
1960). The per se rule against bigness adopted by the early Court caused the antitrust laws
to be used as a "charter to roll back the supermarket revolution" so as to preserve small
local businesses which in many instances had become "economically and technologically ob-
solete." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 288 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
50 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); see also supra note 4 (discussing some advantages of mergers).
But see Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) (merger which pro-
motes efficiency may still be prohibited by per se rule for sake of business certainty).
11 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-500 (1974); Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. at 287-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the view of one commentator, the
Court has actually swung in the opposite direction, "discarding precedent and straining
statutory language and legislative history in an effort to avoid finding a Section 7 violation,"
in effect adopting a new "anti-antitrust bias." Marinelli, supra note 48, at 204. Another
commentator finds that the Supreme Court has not only abandoned any presumption of
illegality based on market share, but that it has also adopted "substantive presumptions in
favor of the validity of the challenged merger... [and] has raised the threshold of illegality
perceptibly." Fox, Antitrust Mergers and the Supreme Court: The Politics of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 26 MERCER L. REv. 389, 390 (1975) (emphasis added).
"' See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 (1974) (Su-
preme Court declined to adopt per se rule against geographic market extention mergers);
General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 497-98 (statistical data alone do not mandate determination
as to effects on competition); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981
(2d Cir. 1984) (large post-merger market share raisesd only a rebuttable presumption of
illegality); see also 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at 26,825 (market share is not
used as "strict mathematical rule[]" for determining antitrust violations); cf. T. VAKERICS,
supra note 2, § 9.01, at 9-2 (Justice Department and FTC more likely to permit mergers
involving firms with larger market shares than in the past).
'1 See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 496-500; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 334-35 (1962); Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988); see also 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at
26,825 (Justice Department will not challenge mergers based solely on market share); D.
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 56 (1986) (rule of reason permits
mergers when social gains exceed losses).
0' 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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with large market shares can be so inherently dangerous that they
must be enjoined.5 5 However, after recognizing that merger cases
were being decided solely on market-share data, the Supreme
Court rejected this approach and required that some evidence of
the anticompetitive effects of the transaction be demonstrated.56
Although post-acquisition market share remains an important fac-
tor in determining whether a proposed merger will be injurious to
competition,57 it must be viewed along with other relevant eco-
nomic factors.58 Even at the preliminary injunction stage, the as-
sertion that a proposed merger is presumed illegal based solely on
market share appears facially untenable. 9 It is submitted that the
Cargill rule is the culmination of a two decade movement toward
allowing vigorous competition for increased market share so long
as it remains within the boundaries of fair play.e0 By equating a
substantial market share with a threat of antitrust injury, the R.C.
Bigelow court has reverted back to the mechanical rules thought to
Id. at 363.
General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 496-500. A potential monopoly, standing alone, is no
longer sufficient to demonstrate a threat of antitrust injury. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo.,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 123 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Phototron Corp., 842 F.2d at 100; see
also supra note 8 (meaning of "antitrust injury").
57 See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 498; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38, 343. "Sta-
tistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the industry leaders and the parties
to the merger are, of course, the primary index of market power. . .[and] one of the most
important factors to be considered when determining the probable effects of the combina-
tion on effective competition. . . ." Id.
11 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 (1974); General Dy-
namics, 415 U.S. at 498; United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1071-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971). Other impor-
tant factors to be considered in addition to market share include industry trends toward
concentration, the degree of concentration presently in the industry, the acquisition history
of the merging firms, and the barriers to entry into the industry. Id.
r- See Phototron Corp, 842 F.2d at 102 ("Proof that an entity will commit bad acts is
difficult to provide at the preliminary injunction stage"); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979) (more than "a finding of monopoly power [is]
necessary to complete a violation"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Under the modern
view, competitors may obtain a preliminary injunction only upon a showing of some an-
ticompetitive behavior demonstrating a substantial likelihood of antitrust injury, and the
plaintiff must produce some evidence of this type to survive a summary judgment motion.
See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121-22; Phototron Corp., 842 F.2d at 102; see also General Dynam-
ics, 418 U.S. at 498 (market share not conclusive indicator of anticompetitive effects). To
allow a firm to challenge a competitor's merger based on market share alone, "on the basis
of essentially no evidence" of future anticompetitive effects, goes further than the Supreme
Court has been willing to go. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 623; supra note 7 (dis-
cussing potentially fatal nature of injunctive relief on corporate mergers).
18 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116. Vigorous competition for increased market share does
not, without more, constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. See id.
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have been finally eliminated by Cargill.
R.C. Bigelow AND THE CHILLING OF COMPETITION
The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote and encourage
free enterprises' so that the benefits which accrue to market par-
ticipants by virtue of vigorous competition may be passed along to
consumers.62 Accordingly, it has often been said that the antitrust
laws were intended to protect competition, not competitors.63
Therefore, only those activities which may be denoted as anticom-
petitive, predatory, or inimical to free competition are prohibited
by the antitrust laws. 4 However, by conferring antitrust standing
under section 16 based solely on market-share data, without a
showing of predatory intent,65 the R.C. Bigelow court cleared the
way for market-share contenders to challenge their competitors
merely because they enjoy more success in the marketplace.6
Thus, the antitrust laws, which are supposed to serve as a deter-
rent to anticompetitive behavior, may instead deter vigorous com-
petitors for fear of long and expensive antitrust litigation. 7 This
11 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978);
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
62 See supra note 1 (discussing how competition benefits consumers); supra note 2 (dis-
cussing antitrust laws and their purpose).
63 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Injuries which reduce
competition and, consequently, injure consumers are the types of injuries which are cogniza-
ble under the antitrust laws. Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Lewyn & Mann, supra note 4, at 1072; see also
supra note 1 (discussing relation between competition and consumer interest).
64 See Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Corp., 842 F.2d 95, 100-01 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988). However, the antitrust laws do not provide protection from
continued or vigorous competition. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-10; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344. Small business
may be adversely affected by such competition, even to the point of being driven out of the
market, but so long as the competition is legitimate, the antitrust laws provide no relief
since it would be "inimical to award damages" for continued competition. Brunswick, 429
U.S. at 488.
65 See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 109.
66 Cf. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116-17 (1986). Under the holding in Cargill, relief should be
granted under § 16 only where losses will result from predatory practices forbidden by the
antitrust laws. Id. at 116. Successfully competing for market share by legitimate means is
not such an activity. See id. at 117. Legitimate means of gaining such status include success-
ful price competition, see id. at 116-17, the exercise of superior business skill, see United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956), and eliminating competi-
tion by being more efficient. See R.C. Bigelow, 689 F. Supp. at 88; R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 138 (1978).
67 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116-17; Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEo. L.J. 1053,
1068-69 (1989) (discussing considerable attorneys fees involved in antitrust litigation). The
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danger is particularly acute in merger cases since firms faced with
injunctions may choose to forego transactions which could promote
efficiency"8 in order to avoid potential lawsuits.6 9 Caution is espe-
cially necessary where, as in R.C. Bigelow, allegations of predatory
pricing are raised since the means by which a firm engages in pred-
atory pricing-cutting prices-is the same as it employs to stimu-
late competition. 0 Legitimate price competition is not the type of
activity which was intended to be the subject of antitrust prohibi-
tions.71 Absent some showing of conduct proscribed by the anti-
trust laws, competitors should not be granted standing to seek a
heavy burden placed on the court system by private antitrust actions also bears noting. See
B. KELLMAN, supra note 2, at vii. From 1960 to 1980, the number of such actions almost
doubled every five years, so that more than six times as many private antitrust suits were
begun in 1980 as in 1960. Id. Further, in 1980 antitrust actions accounted for less than one
percent of the civil cases in the federal courts, but 4.1% of cases pending for more than
three years, and 24% of cases needing more than 20 days to try. W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING
ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION 4 (1982).
" See Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1980). Mergers may serve to increase efficiency in a number of
ways. Id. Horizontal mergers may provide the volume required for economies that result
from obtaining a large size. Id. Vertical mergers may also increase efficiency where internal
operation costs are less than those of non-integrated firms in that market. Id.; see also
supra note 4 (describing the various types of mergers).
19 See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 510 & n.8
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). The R.C. Bigelow court emphasized that
its decision granted the plaintiff standing only to seek a preliminary injunction. See R.C.
Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 111. This is of little comfort to the party accused of an antitrust viola-
tion however, given the "onerous effects" of a preliminary injunction, Phototron Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988), which
forces the defendant to chose between foregoing what it believes to be a beneficial transac-
tion or engaging in a lengthy and expensive trial. Allis-Chalmers, 414 F.2d at 510 & n.8.
Therefore, although "no rigorous proof of antitrust injury [is] necessary at this early stage. .
. more than mere pleading is necessary to establish standing." Phototron Corp., 842 F.2d at
98. The courts have been increasingly cognizant of the dilemma antitrust defendants face in
having to choose between settling cases of questionable merit and facing the burdens of
fruitless litigation, and as a result have been more ready to grant them summary judgment
where plaintiffs put forward sparse evidence of antitrust injury. See id. at 98; Ashley Mead-
ows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Assoc., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
'0 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 121 n.17; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1986). Because price competition for market share is a legitimate form
of competition, see Cargill, 479 U.S at 116-17, it is imprudent to conclude solely from a
showing of substantial market share that antitrust injury will likely result, and to do so may
serve to deter what is actually pro-competitive activity of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to promote. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593-94; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984).
71 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 116-17; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593-94; Monsanto Co., 465
U.S. at 762-64.
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remedy as potentially fatal as a preliminary injunction simply in
the hope that some evidence might later develop at a full trial.72
This is not to say that competitors will be denied relief should
such evidence later surface. 73 Although a remedy under section 16
may be foreclosed at that point, an action for treble damages
under section 4 would still be available. 4
CONCLUSION
In R.C. Bigelow, the Second Circuit recognized the Supreme
Court's mandate requiring antitrust injury for standing in a section
16 antitrust suit. However, the court also established a more leni-
ent standard under section 16, holding that a substantial market
share is in itself sufficient to confer antitrust standing. In doing so,
the court has reverted back to an era of applying mechanical rules
in furtherance of a bias against large corporations. Such a bias will
in fact defeat the pro-competitive purpose of the antitrust laws by
presenting a threat of meritless litigation and thus chilling vigor-
ous and legitimate competition for market share.
Robert F. Nostramo
72 First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968); T. VAKERICS,
supra note 2, § 3.02121, at 3-5.
73 Phototron Corp., 842 F.2d at 102.
74 Id.; see also supra note 6 (discussing treble damages under § 4).
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